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In 2002, an overweight, sedentary, and middle-aged man suffered a heart 
attack during his first workout with his “certified” personal trainer.  During the 
workout, the man repeatedly asked to stop because he was experiencing 
fatigue, heat, thirst, breathlessness, and chest pain.  The trainer responded to 
requests to stop and complaints of fatigue by questioning his client’s masculinity 
and by continuing the workout.  In the lawsuit that followed (Rostai v. Neste 
Enterprises, 2006), the court did not have the option to consider a statutorily 
defined standard of care since no licensing requirements existed for those who 
design and/or lead fitness programs.  The court examined the facts and law as 
presented including the trainer’s conduct, expert testimony, as well as a 
doctrine known as “primary assumption of risk.”  In the end, the court held that 
under this doctrine, the trainer owed no duty to protect a client from the risks 
inherent with exercise or to avoid challenging him beyond his current capacity 
during an initial training session.  Simply put, the client assumed the risks 
associated with exercise, including a risk as serious as a heart attack [1, 2]. 
 
The conclusions reached by the Rostai court epitomize the concern of 
professional exercise physiologists who urge the statutory adoption of a 
standard of care that imposes minimal education standards for those who 
practice exercise physiology. For example, the President of the American 
Society of Exercise Physiologists (ASEP), recently questioned the justice of 
requiring a license to cut hair but not to “put a middle-aged, obese, 
hypertensive, arrhythmic client on a treadmill” [3]. The basis of licensing laws 
regulating professional standards is the protection of public health from 
unreasonable risk of harm [4, 5].   Statutes mandate a standard of care in some 
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professions by regulating factors such as minimal educational qualifications, 
competency testing, delimited areas of practice, and physical inspection of 
sites.  So, the question is fairly asked: On what basis of law or policy is the 
patron in a hair salon protected but not the client under the direction of a 
personal trainer? 
 
The purpose of this paper is to address the risk to public health when personal 
fitness trainers are allowed and encouraged to prescribe exercise, without 
sufficient background and training to fully understand the critical role of exercise 
intensity and progression to the safety and well being of 
clients.  The Rostai case is critical for both legal and educational reasons and 
will be heavily relied upon throughout this paper.  From a legal perspective, the 
case is unique because it specifically considers the conduct of a personal 
trainer and relieves the trainer for liability in negligence based upon the doctrine 
of primary assumption of risk. From an educational perspective, the case is 
riddled with gross misunderstandings about fundamentals of exercise 
physiology and fails entirely to recognize the distinction between a “fitness 
trainer” and an exercise physiologist.  Until there is resolution of these issues, 
an unwary public will remain at risk when subjected to the “fitness trainer” 
without a standard of care. 
 
Negligence:  Duty v. Assumption of Risk 
Negligence is conduct that falls below a standard of care established by law for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. To prevail on a 
negligence claim, the plaintiff has to show that the defendant both owed and 
breached a duty of care to the plaintiff.  The existence of duty and whether a 
particular person’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty are circumstance-
specific. General principles of negligence obligate each person to a standard of 
care of an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent person under the same or similar 
circumstances.  However, public policy, case law, and statutory law drive legal 




The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is an exception to the general rule 
that all persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others and, when 
applied, the doctrine acts as a complete defense to negligence.  The doctrine 
applies to sports or recreational activities where “conditions or conduct that 
otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport 
itself” and their removal would alter the nature of the sport. [6; 7, p. 315].  The 
doctrine typically applies to sporting activities or other related forms of 
recreation (e.g., down hill skiing, white water rafting, rock climbing, a long 
distance bicycle race, skateboarding).  In these types of activities, the “integral 
conditions of the sport or the inherent risks of careless conduct by others” make 
the possibility of injury obvious and relieve a defendant of a duty of care for the 
particular risks of harm associated with the activity. The overriding consideration 
 3 
is to avoid imposing a duty which might “chill vigorous participation” in the 
activity and “thereby alter its fundamental nature” or purpose [8]. 
 
Primary assumption of a risk applies broadly and includes some activities that 
merely resemble sports.  An activity may qualify as a sport if the activity is done 
for enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion and skill, and involves a 
challenge containing a potential risk of injury [8, p.1229].  In Rostai, for 
example, working out in a gym with a personal trainer was an activity subject to 
primary assumption of risk and was the specific basis on which on which the 
court relieved a personal trainer of any duty to his client [1]. 
 
Rostai v. Neste Enterprises (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 326 
In Rostai, a middle-aged, overweight, and sedentary man contracted with a 
“certified” personal trainer for a customized workout and had a heart attack at 
the end of the first session [1].  The court found that the trainer knew that Rostai 
was not physically fit and was overweight at the initial training session [1].  The 
trainer testified that he did not investigate Rostai’s health history or current 
status prior to the first workout and that he had never heard of the term “cardiac 
risk factors” [9].  The court applied the “law” of risk and duty to the “facts” of the 
workout and held that the trainer owed no duty of care to the client at 
all.  Specifically, the court held that Rostai assumed the risks integral to 
exercise, including the risk of a heart attack, and that his personal trainer did not 
breach a duty of care simply by leading a challenging and strenuous initial 
workout [1]. 
 
The workout started with level treadmill work for 12 to 13 minutes at 3 to 4 mph. 
This was followed with weights on an incline bench (overhead lifts, 10 
repetitions at 40 lbs per repetition, followed by 10 more repetitions with slightly 
heavier weights). Rostai then asked for a break, but the trainer said, “Later,” 
and had Rostai do 10 push-ups. Rostai asked again asked for a break, telling 
the trainer that he was really tired and out of breath, to which the trainer 
responded, “Don't be a pussy” and “First, give me 10 sit-ups.” 
 
Rostai completed the sit-ups and then returned to the incline bench to repeat 
the earlier weight exercise but with the next heavier weight and at a faster 
tempo. After 4 or 5 repetitions, Rostai said he could not do any more and 
stopped. The trainer reputedly pointed to a nearby woman and said to Rostai, 
“Come on, don't you want to get some of this ass?” 
 
Rostai was then instructed to lie down on a mat and lift both legs 
simultaneously. He stopped after performing one leg lift. The trainer grabbed 
Rostai's legs and pushed them toward Rostai's head 10 to 12 times. Toward the 
end of this exercise, Rostai told the trainer that he was out of breath, could not 
breathe, and needed some water but he did not tell the trainer that he was 
experiencing chest pain. The workout stopped because Rostai felt he could not 
continue. After pouring water over his head, Rostai laid down on the floor in 
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extreme pain and, after about 5 minutes, said “Call 911, I think I'm having 
a heart attack.”  Rostai was right and later that day underwent emergency 
angiography and emergency surgery for the placement of two coronary stents. 
 
Rostai sued the trainer alleging that the trainer’s conduct breached a standard 
of care that caused the heart attack.  Specifically, Rostai alleged that the trainer 
failed to properly assess Rostai’s physical condition and cardiac risk factors and 
that the trainer‘s training approach was too aggressive. These failures, 
according to Rostai, constituted a breach of duty that caused the heart attack to 
occur during the workout under his trainer’s supervision [1; 10, p. 6]. 
 
Rostai’s supporting evidence included the declaration of an expert, an associate 
professor in exercise science at the University of Southern California.  The 
expert’s declaration explicitly referenced the manual received by the trainer in 
obtaining his certification with the American Muscle and Fitness Personal 
Training Institute (AMFPT).  The manual contained sections commenting on the 
importance of limiting the time of the first workout to no more than five or ten 
minutes, carefully observing clients for shortness of breath (especially if they 
are seniors or overweight) and noting that cardiovascular health problems may 
be exacerbated by exercise [11].  In reliance upon AMFPT standards in the 
organization’s manual, the expert declared that “greater scrutiny should be 
exercised in monitoring individuals at health and fitness clubs . . .” [1, 9]. 
 
The trainer testified in a deposition what he was aware that the first workout 
should be at a lower intensity and that exercise could exacerbate certain health 
problems, including cardiovascular disease.  He also testified that he had never 
heard of the terms “cardiac risk factors” or “heart risk factors”.  A physician 
testified that the heart attack suffered by Rostai, a placque, could have been 
caused by any number of factors including sleeplessness, stress, nutrition, and 
exercise [9]. 
 
With this evidence, the court concluded that at most the trainer did not 
accurately assess Rostai's level of physical fitness. Further, the undisputed 
evidence failed to show that the trainer acted recklessly or that he breached a 
duty of care to Rostai. 
 
 
He [the trainer] also may have interpreted Rostai's physical 
complaints,  including his tiredness, shortness of breath, and profuse sweating, 
as the usual signs of physical exertion due to lack of conditioning rather than as 
symptoms of a heart attack. There is no evidence, however, that defendant [the 
trainer] acted with intent to injure Rostai or acted recklessly and thereby 
increased the risk inherent in the activity itself. Because the undisputed 
evidence in this case fails to show that defendant [trainer] breached a duty of 
care owed to Rostai….[1, p. 336]. 
 
 5 
The court further concluded that ordinary negligence was not a sufficient basis 
to impose liability upon the trainer.  In order to state a cause of action against a 
personal  fitness trainer, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the trainer acted 
either with intent to cause injury or that the trainer acted recklessly in that the 
conduct was “totally outside the range of ordinary activity  involved in [personal 
fitness training]” [1].  This raises the question of explicit AMFPT’s standards for 
the first exercise session and the importance of observing a client’s response to 
exercise (see above). The length of this first workout was in direct contradiction 
to AMFPT.  The issue of “ordinary” within a professional context goes to the 
heart of whether those who practice exercise physiology under these 
circumstances should be held to knowledge of cardiac risk factors and 
circumstances that may precipitate an event. 
 
The Rostai Court’s Analysis: Duty v. Risk 
The Rostai court analyzed the doctrine of primary assumption of risk by 
focusing on its overriding consideration.  The overriding consideration is to 
avoid imposing a duty that might chill vigorous participation in the implicated 
activity and thereby alter its fundamental nature [1, pp. 331-333]. 
 
Defendant argued that imposing a duty on personal trainers to avoid subjecting 
their students to a strenuous workout would invariably chill vigorous 
participation in fitness training and alter its fundamental nature by undermining 
the very purpose of private fitness training [10, pp. 14-15].  Defendant argued 
that trainers were not cardiologists who could monitor response to exercise in a 
sophisticated laboratory setting but were obligated to administer strenuous 
workouts in order to achieve either a fitness or appearance benefit.  Liability for 
negligence would deter trainers from vigorous training and radically alter the 
fundamental nature of fitness training.  
 
 
If liability were imposed on personal trainers for miscalculating, even 
negligently, the amount of exertion their students' cardiovascular systems could 
tolerate, trainers, fearing liability, would be unwilling to administer strenuous 
workouts…Students would be thwarted in their efforts to improve their overall 
level of fitness and appearance. The very purpose of private fitness training 
would be undermined [10, pp. 14-15]. 
 
Imposing liability on [the trainer] here because he pushed Plaintiff and did not, 
in hindsight, accurately “assess and evaluate” the condition of Plaintiffs 
cardiovascular system before the workout began would severely alter the 
fundamental nature of fitness training. Not knowing who among their students 
was a “ticking cardiac time bomb” with an undiagnosed heart condition, trainers 
would never push their students. Students would stagnate and never achieve 
their fitness goals. This is precisely the sort of chilling effect which would deter 
fitness instructors from vigorously training their students and radically alter the 
fundamental nature of private fitness training [10, pp. 14-15]. 
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The court agreed completely with the Defendant in holding that the obvious 
purpose of working out with a personal trainer is to improve physical fitness and 
appearance that requires participation in strenuous exercise.  The inherent risks 
include physical distress in general, soft tissue injuries, and damage to the 
heart. 
 
In order to accomplish that goal, the participant must engage in strenuous 
physical activity. The risks inherent in that activity include physical distress in 
general, and in particular muscle strains, sprains, tears, and pulls, not only of 
the obvious muscles such as those in the legs and arms, but also of less 
obvious muscles such as the heart. Stress on the cardiovascular system as a 
result of the physical exertion that is an integral part of fitness training with a 
personal trainer is a risk inherent in the activity. Eliminating that risk would alter 
the fundamental nature of the activity [1, p. 333]. 
 
In addition to consideration of inherent risks, the court addressed the question 
of duty by examining the parties’ relationship while participating in the activity; 
specifically, the role of the trainer whose conduct is at issue was 
considered.  The court analogized this relationship to those in competitive 
sports by citing examples of differential duties of care owed in baseball, touch 
football, and high school swimming.  The pedagogical relationship between 
coach and athlete was also cited by the court.  The court disputed the client’s 
characterization of the trainer’s role and held that the relationship of trainer to 
the client was to instruct and challenge. 
 
Although [Rostai] phrases his claim against [the trainer] in terms of failing to 
adequately assess plaintiff's physical condition and in particular his cardiac risk 
factors, the essence of plaintiff's claim is that Shoultz, in his capacity as 
plaintiff's personal fitness trainer, challenged plaintiff to perform beyond his level 
of physical ability and fitness. That challenge, however, is the very purpose of 
fitness training, and is precisely the reason one would pay for the services of a 
personal trainer. Like the coach in other sports or physical activities, the 
personal trainer's role in physical fitness training is not only to instruct the 
participant in proper exercise techniques but also to develop a training program 
that requires the participant to stretch his or her current abilities in order to 
become more physically fit. The trainer's function in the training process is, at 
bottom, to urge and challenge the participant to work muscles to their limits and 
to overcome physical and psychological barriers to doing so. Inherent in that 
process is the risk that the trainer will not accurately assess the participant's 
ability and the participant will be injured as a result [1, p. 334]. 
 
To instruct is to challenge, and the very nature of challenge is that it will not 
always be met. It is not unreasonable to require a plaintiff who has chosen to be 
instructed in a particular activity to bear the risk that he or she will not be able to 
meet the challenges posed by the instructor, at least in the absence of 
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intentional misconduct or recklessness on the part of the instructor. Any other 
rule would discourage instructors from asking their students to do anything 
more than they have done in the past, would therefore have a chilling effect on 
instruction, and thus would have a negative impact on the very purpose for 
seeking instruction: mastering the activity [1, p. 334]. 
 
It is important to note that Rostai was decided on the basis of a summary 
judgment, a “trial on paper” that precludes the need for a jury.  A prerequisite to 
summary judgment is undisputed facts that allow a judge to decide a case as a 
“matter of law.” As a matter of law and with “undisputed” facts, the Rostai court 
held that Rostai assumed the risk of a heart attack and, therefore, the trainer 
had no duty of care to him.  One can only surmise the benefit to Rostai had 
there been a successful challenge to “undisputed” facts and had there been a 
jury trial. One can only imagine the benefit to legal precedent and protection of 
the public had a professional exercise physiologist been able to testify openly in 
court regarding such things as the purpose of fitness training, the proper role of 
a personal trainer, the relationship between client and trainer, acute 
physiological responses to exercise, physiological risk factors based upon age, 
weight, and lifestyle, and the proper determination of intensity during a 
workout.   
 
The Professional Exercise Physiologist’s Analysis of Rostai 
The following section offers comments on the Rostai case from the perspective 
of an exercise physiologist.  It is not a legal analysis; rather it is a statement on 
how exercise physiologists should function and what protection should be 
afforded the public.  This section takes exception to the Rostai court's analysis 
of the circumstances and offers a decidedly different interpretation. 
 
Licensing statutes mandate a standard of care in cosmetology [12] and other 
professions, such as massage therapy [13] and physical therapy [14], by 
regulating such things as minimal educational qualifications, competency 
testing, delimited areas of practice, and physical inspection of sites.  The same 
policy consideration, protection of public health, underlies the requirements of 
the American Society of Exercise Physiologists (ASEP) for Board Certification 
of Exercise Physiologists [15] and the accreditation of college/university 
academic programs [16]. Hence, in regards to the ASEP perspective, the 
challenge isn’t to secure a legally mandated requirement to obligate a trainer as 
it is to educate the public as to the professional role of the Board Certified 
Exercise Physiologist (EPC).  The EPC is a credible healthcare professional 
who understands that exercise is medicine [17] and as such, then, the exercise 
prescription and other safety measures during exercise are critical to the safety 
and well-being of the client/patient. 
 
In Rostai, the trainer was certified through AMFPT, an online organization that 
advertises “you can begin your compelling new career as a fully certified 
trainer today for only $69.95” [18].  The following information was taken from the 
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AMFPT website.  Note the explicit qualifications: “If you have exercise and 
experience with dieting yourself, you may have the ability to be a good fitness 
trainer.” AMFPT’s certification process includes inducements such as it’s easy 
and fast, one day process, and that “you can become a fully certified Personal 
Trainer this week without waiting, driving to a distant site, or even leaving your 
house.”  Clearly, this is not a professional certification by any reasonable 
standard. 
 
Licensing statutes mandate a standard of care in cosmetology [12] and other 
professions, such as massage therapy [13] and physical therapy [14], by 
regulating such things as minimal educational qualifications, competency 
testing, delimited areas of practice, and physical inspection of sites. There are 
no licensing mandates for personal trainers. However, the American Society of 
Exercise Physiologists (ASEP) has a Board Certification program for Exercise 
Physiologists [15] and an accreditation program for college/university academic 
programs [16] so that educational standards exist for exercise professionals. 
The ASEP challenge is not to secure legal obligations of a personal trainer, but 
rather to educate the public as to the role of the Board Certified Exercise 
Physiologist (EPC). The EPC is a credible healthcare professional who 
understands the efficacious role of exercise as medicine [17] and the safety 
measures that should be in place to assure that an exercise prescription is 
appropriate for the well-being of the client/patient. 
 
In Rostai, the trainer was certified through AMFPT, an online organization that 
advertises “you can begin your compelling new career as a fully certified 
trainer today for only $69.95” [18].  The following information was taken from the 
AMFPT website. Note the explicit qualifications: “If you have exercise and 
experience with dieting yourself, you may have the ability to be a good fitness 
trainer.” AMFPT’s certification process includes inducements such as it’s easy 
and fast, one day process, and that “you can become a fully certified Personal 
Trainer this week without waiting, driving to a distant site, or even leaving your 
house.”  Clearly this is not a professional certification by any reasonable 
standard.   
 
The Rostai court had evidence that AMFPT’s certification process included 
content relevant to the circumstances of a middle-aged overweight and 
sedentary man beginning exercise. There was testimony that the trainer 
violated AMFPT standards.  Additionally, plaintiff’s expert testified that that 
“greater scrutiny should be exercised in monitoring individuals at health and 
fitness clubs.”  It should be noted that the testimony of the expert witness for 
Rostai was disregarded in part because it was inadmissible. How much this 
impacted the court is speculative. Nonetheless the court’s decision was 
disingenuous at best and disastrous at worst. To hold that the trainer owed no 
duty is simply bad thinking. To find that Rostai assumed the risk of a heart 
attack under the circumstances is irresponsible.  Given the trainers approach to 
a first exercise bout for a middle-aged, inactive and overweight adult, it is 
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reasonable that the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff’s heart attack. A 
physical trainer, coach, physical therapist, or a Board Certified Exercise 
Physiologist should conform to a standard of conduct and duty to avoid harm 
and damage to their client. For the court to affirm that the personal trainer in the 
Rostai case was not responsible for their conduct toward the client is clearly an 
example of bad thinking that lead to a bad decision.   
 
Unfortunately, the doctrine of assumption of risk prevailed as a defense to duty 
in this case.  The doctrine applies to sports or recreational activities where 
“conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are 
an integral part of the sport itself” and their removal would alter the nature of the 
sport. [6; 7, p. 315]. On this basis, the court relieved the trainer of any duty of 
care to Rostai. This comparison of sport participation with participation in a 
fitness program represents flawed thinking and a complete misunderstanding by 
the court of the nature of an exercise professionals role in this setting. The 
undisputed facts of this case show that Rostai asked to stop exercising (i.e., he 
demonstrated that is was trying to avoid injury to himself), but the defendant 
pushed him on, relentlessly, without regard to the plaintiff's well-being or safety. 
This is simply a case of the defendant’s failure to anticipate the health needs of 
his client by altering the scope of training as opposed to the nature of training. 
<>  
 
The defendant's use of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk "that the idea 
that the plaintiff had a duty to stop exercising is by virtue of the relationship 
between trainer and client” is fundamentally flawed thinking.  Most clients would 
be, as the plaintiff was, subject to the authority of the personal trainer. Further, It 
is reasonable to assert that the defendant should have evaluated the plaintiff's 
cardiovascular health prior to the first training workout and tailored the workout 
to match the defendant’s capabilities.  The defendant acted recklessly in 
pushing the plaintiff beyond his capabilities during the workout without apparent 
knowledge of the danger to his client.  These unsettling facts speak to the total 
lack of academic and scientific training necessary to customize a physical 
fitness program for an overweight and sedentary client.   
 
The idea that the plaintiff's heart attack was an inherent risk of a structured 
physical training program makes absolutely no sense. In this case the plaintiff 
hired the defendant to personally design and oversee his exercise program. The 
plaintiff assumed and depended on the trainer to prescribe activity that would be 
healthy for him. The plaintiff thought he was hiring a personal trainer who had 
the knowledge, training, and understanding to train people (i.e., provide the 
necessary guidance to lose weight and get healthier and, obviously, to do it 
safely). Instead of getting stronger and healthier, the "first session" could have 
resulted in the plaintiff's death from a heart attack.  If there is no standard of 
care for a personal trainer then indeed, the public is at risk. Whether it is a 
person who goes to a cosmetologist, a massage therapist or a physical 
therapist, there is an expected standard of care. Without any acceptable 
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standards for personal trainers, the risk for a client can be compared to 
participation in sport activity. Athletes have come to understand that they bear 
the risk of their participation, and this should be different from hiring a personal 
trainer who designs a fitness program to help the client avoid musculoskeletal 
and/or cardiovascular problems. The bottom line is that fitness programs are not 
sports programs! The risk inherent in the activity of each is totally different. 
Clearly, those who participate in sports must acknowledge the risk of their 
participation. This is why in the absence of legally enforceable standards, the 
predatory nature of online and inexpensive companies that certify trainers 
without accountability will pose an increasing and potentially deadly risk to the 
public.   
 
The question before the reader is whether a personal trainer should be held to 
some standard of practice. Should personal trainers be allowed to act as though 
they know what they are doing, but lack any standard of knowledge and 
practice? In the Rostai case the personal trainer displayed flawed behavior and 
recklessness in their conduct. It is clear that the personal trainer had little to no 
knowledge of the risk involved in training middle-aged adults and illustrates why 
personal trainers in general should not be allowed to practice as health 
professionals. Many, if not most, personal trainers lack a comprehensive 
educational foundation in applied anatomy, cardiovascular physiology, sports 
and human biomechanics, physiological assessment, and pathology to be able 
to safely prescribe and monitor exercise programs. Without fundamental 
training in these areas, personal trainers are prone to embrace irrelevant and 
misleading information that could be harmful to their clients. This is exactly why 
there should be some standard of care for personal trainers, and why the Board 
Certified Exercise Physiologist is the professional of choice when it comes to 
individualized personal training, whether it is for fitness enhancement, athletics, 
or rehabilitation.    
 
Board Certification of an Exercise Physiologist as a health professional is 
important because it provides educational and practice standards that are 
needed to provide the scientific foundation for a safe exercise program. The 
ASEP Standards of Professional Practice [19] establish a benchmark for an 
exercise physiologist to meet, this assures the general public will have access 
to an exercise professional that can safely and accurately prescribe and 
oversee an exercise program.   
 
It is possible that Rostai reached its conclusions based upon inadequate or 
unpersuasive evidence. The court’s failure to recognize the most rudimentary 
principles of "exercise as medicine" is stunning to the professional exercise 
physiologist. The court erroneously concluded that vigorous exercise is 
necessary to achieve fitness, failed to properly distinguish skeletal and cardiac 
muscle, expressed a decided lack of understanding of overload or minimal 
thresholds to achieve a training effect, inappropriately defined the purpose of 
training, and failed to acknowledge disparate risks of exercise in the young 
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versus middle-aged. Misunderstanding on these issues is at odds with 
protection of public health. Resolution is as much an educational as a legal 
issue, and it is incumbent upon the profession of exercise physiology to 
dedicate resources to the implementation of a strategy that will offer a remedy. 
Until that time, the public will remain at risk when trainers have no standard of 
care to which they are legally obligated. 
 
Conclusion 
In the case of the personal trainers, the standard of care to which they are 
legally obligated is ambiguous at best for a number of reasons.  Case law 
examining the specific activity of fitness training under the guidance of a trainer 
is lacking.  Similarly, statutory provisions regulating personal trainers are 
lacking.  Policy premised upon strained analogies to “sport” currently and 
ignorance regarding fundamental principles of exercise physiology establish the 
personal trainer’s duty of care as being entirely inadequate.  Unfortunately, this 
leaves the client vulnerable to damages without recourse when harmed by a 
personal trainer whose conduct violates both a common sense approach to 
exercise training as well as the scientific foundations of an exercise program 
and prescription as identified by a Board Certified Exercise Physiologists.  The 
burden remains with professional organizations to explicitly articulate a standard 
of care, and to argue before the public at large that "exercise as medicine" 






1. Rostai v. Neste Enterprises. (2006). 138 Cal.App.4th 326. 
2. Trial Order. (2004). Rostai v. Gold’s Gym, WL 
5319579.  [Online].  http://web2.westlaw.com/find/WL 5319579 
3. Lowery, L. (2008).  Where is Exercise Physiology Headed?  ASEPNewsletter 
Editorial.  Received by email January 5, 2008. 
4. Singer, N. (2007).  “Legislation for the Public Good.”  3A Sutherland Statutory 
Construction.  Section 73:2 (6th edition).  St. Paul, Minnesota: Thompson/West 
Publishing Co. 
[Online]. http://web2.westlaw.com/find/sutherlandstatutoryconstuction 
5. Mains v. Board of Barber Examiners. (1967). 249 Cal. App. 2d 459 
6. Keeton, W., Dobbs, D., Keeton, R., and Owen, D. (Eds). (1984). Prosser and 
Keaton on the 
law of torts.  St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 
 12 
7. Knight v. Jewett. (1992). 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315. 
8. Muchhala v. United States. (2007). 532 F.Supp.2d 1215. 
9. Proposed Trial Order. (2004). Rostai v. Gold’s Gym, WL 
5319578.  [Online] http://web2.westlaw.com/find/WL 5319578 
10. Respondents' Brief. (2005). Rostai v. Neste Enterprises,WL 3741956. 
[Online]. http://web2.westlaw.com/find/WL 3741956 
11. Appellant’s Opening Brief. (2005). Rostai v. Neste Enterprises, WL3147606. 
[Online].http://web2.westlaw.com/find/WL3147606 
12. Beauty Schools Directory. (2008). State Licensure Requirements. 
[Online].      http://www.beautyschoolsdirectory.com/faq/state_req.php 
13. Massagetherapy.com/ (2008). State Boards and Requirements. 
[Online].http://www.massagetherapy.com/careers/stateboards.php 
14. The Federation of State Boards of Physical Therapy. (2008). Welcome to the 
FSBPT 
Website. [Online]. http://www.fsbpt.org/ 
15. American Society of Exercise Physiologists. (2008). Board Certification for 
Exercise Physiologists. [Online].http://www.asep.org/services/EPCexam 
16. American Society of Exercise Physiologists. (2008). Accreditation. 
[Online]. http://www.asep.org/services/accreditation 
17. Boone, T. (2008). Exercise As Medicine. Professionalization of Exercise 
Physiologyonline. 11:2 
[Online].http://www.asep.org/asep/asep/ExerciseASmedicine.html 
18. American Muscle and Fitness Personal Training Institute. (2008). AMFPT. 
[Online]. http://gregladd.bizland.com/amfpt22/id9.html 
19. American Society of Exercise Physiologists. (2008). Standards of Professional 




Corresponding Author:  Margaret E. Ciccolella, Department of Sport 
Sciences, University of the Pacific, 3601 Pacific Avenue, Stockton, CA  95211, 





Copyright ©1997-2008 American Society of Exercise Physiologists   All Rights 
Reserved. 
 
 
